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Corporations and Corporate Agents:
Liability on Commercial Paper Contracts
and Attainment of Holder Status*
When a corporation or its agents are bound by contracts made by
a negotiable instrument. Location of signature and
style of signing as a determinant of liability. Rights of
corporations or their agents when they obtain holder status.
Harold R. Weinberg"*
of Lexington, Kentucky
Introduction
This article focuses on two classes of commercial paper
issues. Section I considers the Uniform Commercial Code
("UCC" or "Code") rules relevant to determining
whether a corporation or its agents are bound by contracts
made upon a negotiable instrument. Application of these
rules continues to be an important and recurrent source of
legal disputes. Section II considers the rights of corpora-
fions or their agents to obtain holder status prerequisite to
enforcing commercial paper contracts. Problems relating
to the attainment of this status can result from corporate
engagement in joint-enterprise with artificial or natural
persons and from the linkage of corporations through
common ownership or in parent-subsidiary relationships.
Enforcement piroblems also may arise as a consequence of
corporate name changes or mergers.
I. Liability of Corporations or Their Agents
on Commercial Paper Contracts
A. Commercial Paper Contracts
A brief review of the nature of commercial paper con-
tracts may be useful before proceeding to questions of
corporate and corporate agent liability. Article Three of
the UCC describes the contracts that may be made by
* Copyright © 1984 by Harold R. Weinberg. All rights reserved.
** The author is a Law Alunni Professor at the University of
Kentucky College of Law.
1. UCC H3410 to -411, 3-413 to -416. The UCC specifies
several ways in which these contracts may be discharged.
See UCC §3-601. The relationship between a commercial
persons who sign commercial paper.i The maker of a note
engages to pay the instrument according to its tenor at the
time of signing. This is a contract of primary liability be-
cause the holder of the note can enforce it against the
maker without prior recourse against any other person.
Drawers of checks engage to pay the check upon its dis-
honor by the drawee bank and the satisfaction of certain
other conditions precedent Indorsers make similar con-
tracts of secondary liability. Other types of commercial
paper contracts include those of acceptors and accommo-
dation parties.
The location of a signature on an instrument and the
language which accompanies it can be important in de-
termining the nature of the contractual liability under-
taken by the signer.2 For example, a signature in the
lower righthand comer of a note usually indicates an in-
tent to sign as a makerO However, makers' contracts have
been made by corporate officers whose personal signa-
tures were placed on the back of a note (which usually
indicates an intent to indorse) where language on the face
of the note ("we promise to pay") suggested that the cor-
poration and the officers intended joint primary liability.
4
The Code resolves ambiguity as to the capacity in which a
signature is made by deeming it to be an indorsement.
paper contract and the underlying obligation is the subject
of UCC §3-802.
2. UCC §3-402 Official Cosmment.
3. O'Grady v. First Union Bank, 296 N.C. 212,250 S.E.2d 587,
26 UCC Rep. 146 (1978).
4. Torkeltoub v. Caravan Motel, Inc., 40 Pa. D. & C.2d 176, 3
UCC Rep. 492 (Pa. C.P. 1968).
5. UCC §3-402.
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B. The Signature Rules
The Code contains signature rules for identifying the
person(s) bound by contracts written on an instrument.6
The principal rules with illustrative examples are as fol-
lows. In the examples Alpha Corp. is the principal and
Brian Douglas is the agent
Rule One. No person is liable on an instrument un-
less his signature appears thereon.
Rule Two. A corporation's signature may be made by
a corporate officer or other agent or representative.8
Rule Three. The name of a corporation preceded or
followed by the name and office ofthe authorized agent
signing on its behalf is the correct way to make a sig-
nature which binds the corporation but not the agent
(Alpha Corp. by Brian Douglas, President).'
Rule Four. An authorized agent who signs his own
name to an instrument is personally obligated if the
instrument neither names the corporate principal nor
shows that the agent signed in a representative capacity
(Brian Douglas).'0
Rule Five. An authorized agent who signs his own
name to an instrument is personally obligated if the
instrument names the corporate principal but does not
show that the agent signed in a representative capacity
(Alpha Corp. Brian Douglas) or if the instrument does
not name the principal but does show that the agent
signed in a representative capacity (Brian Douglas,
President)."
Rule Six. An agent personally obligated by Rule Five
may escape liability through the use of parol evidence
demonstrating that he signed as an agent. The Code
states that this exception applies only as between the
immediate parties to an instrument (such as the maker
and payee of a note) and not when enforcement of the
instrument is sought by a nonimmediate party (such as
a holder who acquired the note from the payee). 1
Rule Seven. An unauthorized signature on an instru-
ment binds the unauthorized signer in favor of any per-
son who in good faith pays the instrument or takes it for
value. 1
The remainder of Section I of this article focuses on the
operation of these principal signature rules and on certain
subsidiary rules.
6. See generally Annot., Construction and Application of
UCC §3-403 (2) Dealing With Personal Liability of Au-
therized Representative Who Signs Negotiable Instrument
in His Own Name, 97 A.L.R.3d 798 (1980); Littlefield,
Corporate Signatures on Negotiable Instruments, 55 DEN.
L. J. 61 (1978); Holland, Corporate Officers Beware-Your
Signature on a Negotiable Instrument May Be Hazardous
to Your Economic Health, 13 InD. L. lsv. 893 (1980); Jor-
dan,Just Sign Here-It's Only a Formality: Parol Evidence
in the Law of Commercial Paper, 13 G. L. REv. 53 (1978).
7. UCC §3-401(1).
8. UCC §§3-403(1), 1-201(35).
9. UCC §3-403(3).
10. UCC 13-403(2)(a).
11. UCC §3-403(2)(b).
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C. Authority to Sign
Rule Two provides for signatures by agents, officers, or
repreasentatives. The power to sign for another may be
established under the general law of agency which, for
the most part, is not contained in the Code. 4 Under
agency law, an agent may be empowered to bind a corpo-
rate principal in several ways:
(1) Grant of express authority by corporate principal
directly to agent through written or spoken words or
other conduct.15
(2) Apparent authority through corporate principal's
written or spoken words or other conduct causing a
third party to believe that the agent is authorized.1
(3) Inherent agency power by virtue of agent's occupy-
ing a particular position in the corporate hierarchy."
In addition, a corporate principal may be estopped to
deny an agent's authority as against a third person who
changed its position in the belief that a transaction was
authorized. 8 The principal may be estopped if it inten-
tionally or carelessly caused such belief It may also be
estopped if it did not take reasonable steps to dispel this
belief after obtaining knowledge that it was held by a
third person who might rely on it.
The Code does not require any particular form of ap-
pointment or power of attorney to establish authority.
However, persons dealing with corporate agents may re-
quire a corporate resolution, by-law, or other documen-
tary evidence of an agent's power to bind its principal.
Many cases have considered the issue of whether an
agent had authority to bind a corporate principal to a
commercial paper contract. Generalizations concerning
these opinions have been offered. It has been stated that
an "agent is not authorized to execute a negotiable in-
strument ... unless he could not pe;form his duties with-
out such authorization" and that apparent authority to in-
dorse "is not readily inferred."" It has also been stated
that an agent's authority to indorse "will be narrowly con-
strued." ' While these guidelines can be helpful, the
question ofwhether an agent is authorized is fact specific
and may require careful examination of precedent."1
D. Signature Binding Corporation
Rule One indicates that a corporation cannot be liable
on an instrument that it has not signed. Under the Code, a
12. UCC §3-403(2)(b).
13. UCC §3-404(1).
14. UCC §§1-103, 3-403(1), 4-405.
15. Restatement (Second) of Agency §§7, 26 (1958).
16. Restatement (Second) of Agency §§8, 27 (1958).
17. Restatement (Second) of Agency §8A (1958).
18. Restatement (Second) of Agency §813 (1958).
19. Sell, Agency §60 (1975).
20. Sell, Agency §60 (1975).
21. See generally Restatement in the Courts (1937)
(Supplemented through 1973); Annot., Authority of Agent
to Indorse and Transfer Commercial Paper, 37 A.L.2d
453 (1954). Problems arising when the corporation lacks
power to authorize a commercial paper contract are dis-
cussed at note 70 and accompanying text infra.
signature may be made by the use of any name, including
a trade name or other word or mark, executed or adopted
with the intention to authenticate a writing.21 Parol evi-
dence is admissible to identify a signer (such as where a
corporate maker is misnamed on a note--"Alpha Fab-
ricators & Equipment Inc." instead of the correct "Alpha
Fabricators & Erectors, Inc.").m Rule One does not per-
mit the use of parol evidence to obtain enforcement ofan
instrument against an undisclosed corporate principal
whose signature does not appear on the instrument. This
is true even though the person who signed had authority
to bind the corporation and even though the payee of the
instrument knew it was intended to be a corporate obli-
gation.
It follows from Rule One that a corporation makes no
contract on the personal check of a corporate agent that
bears the agent's preprinted name and that is signed per-
sonally by the agent (Brian Douglas)."s Nor would there
be a corporate contract on a check that bears no pro-
printed name (such as a counter check) that is signed per-
sonally by a corporate agent.26 A personally signed note
not naming the corporation would not bind the corpora-
tion even though the signer was the corporation's presi-
dent and sole shareholder.,, Rule Four would bind the
agent personally on the instrument in cases such as
these.
2 8
Questions have arisen concerning whether a preprinted
corporate name constitutes a corporate signature. Such a
name at the top of a check has been held not to be a
corporate signature, a conclusion based upon common
sense and commercial experience.29 However, a pre-
printed corporate name in the lower righthand corner ofa
check immediately above a signature line bearing an
agent's personal signature may be binding upon the cor-
poration ([Preprinted] Alpha Corp. [Handwritten] Brian
Douglas)."°
The typewritten name of a corporation also can bind it
on an instrument when it was intended to constitute a
signature. This was the result in a case where the typed
name was in the lower righthand comer of a note and the
name of an authorized corporate officer was personally
signed immediately below the typed corporate name
([Typed] Alpha Corp. [Handwritten] Brian Douglas).3' It
has also been held that a typewritten corporate name
22. UCC §1-201(39),3-403(2).
23. UCC §3-403 Official Comment 2;Atlas Steel Corp. v. Steel
Fabricators & Erectors, Inc., 12 UCC Rep. 910 (Mass. App.
1973).
24. UCC 3-406 Official Comment 1.
25. Kaminsky v. Van Dusen, 88 Misc.2d 833, 390 N.Y.S.2d 544,
21 UCC Rep. 590 (Sup. CL 1976).
26. K-Ross Bldg. Supply Center, Inc. v. Winnipesaukee
Chalets, Inc., 121 N.H. 562, 432 A.2d 8,32 UCC Rep. 1515
(1981) (citing Rule 4).
27. Wielske v. Richardson & Sons, Inc., 83 Wis.2d 359, 265
N.W.2d 571, 24 UCC Rep. 179 (1978). But see Dynamic
Romes, Inc. v. Rogers, 331 So.2d 326, 19 UCC Rep. 560
(Fla. App. 1976). Dynamic Homes suggests that an undis-
closed corporate principal can be obligated by parol evi-
dence. The Editor's Note preceding the report of this
opinion in the Uniform Commercial Code Reporting Ser-
vice indicates that this is incorrect under the Code.
28. Schwartz v. Disneyland Vista Records, 383 So.2d 1117, 29
([Typed] Alpha Corp.) placed on the back of a check is a
corporate indorsement if the name was placed on the
check by an agent with authority to indorse.32
Rule One is also applicable in cases of corporate asset
sales. For example, suppose Alpha Manufacturing, Inc.
makes a bulk transfer of all its assets to Alpha Industries,
Inc., a separate entity. The transferee, Industries, will not
be liable on instruments signed by the transferor, Man-
ufacturing, unless Industries also signs them. The fact
that Industries might be liable to a creditor of Manufac-
turing on some other basis (such as under bulk transfers or
under fraudulent conveyance principles) is irrelevant to
the question of its liability on Manufacturing's instru-
ments.
E. Signature Binding Agent
Personally-Liability Intended
It is sometimes intended for corporate agents to have
personal liability on an instrument which is also intended
to bind the corporation. For example, financial institu-
tions often insist that the shareholders of a close corpora-
tion share responsibility for the repayment of a loan in-
tended to finance corporate operations. Joint liability is
clearly accomplished through the use of a corporate sig-
nature complying with Rule Three and an individual sig-
nature by the agent. The corporation and its officers may
be liable as comakers ( [Front ofinstrument] Alpha Corp.
by Brian Douglas, President [Front of instrument] Brian
Douglas); as maker and indorser( [Front of instrument]
Alpha Corp. by Brian Douglas, President [Back of In-
strument] Brian Douglas), or in other ways.
F. Signature Binding Agent Personally-
Liability Not Intended
Enforcement of commercial paper contracts is fre-
quently sought against agents who deny personal liabil-
ity. Whether the agent can escape liability depends on the
form of his signature and other factors.
1. Agent's Liability Through Personal Signature
Rule Four binds an agent who personally signs an in-
strument (Brian Douglas). The Code's official comments
state that parol evidence is not admissible to prove that a
representative signature was intended31 Many courts
UCC Rep. 1321 (Fla. App. 1980).
29. Littky & Mallon v. Michigan Nat'l Bank, 94 Mich. App. 29,
287 N.W.2d 359, 28 UCC Rep. 715 (1979). But see
Sequoyah State Bank v. Union Nat'l Bank, 32 UCC Rep.
213 (Ark. 1981) (Preprinted bank name constitutes signa-
ture on a money order).
30. See Pollin v. Mindy Mfg. Co., 211 Pa. Super. 87, 236 A.2d
542,4 UCC Rep. 827 (1967); Jenkins v. Evans, 31 App. Div.
2d 267, 295 N.Y.S.2d 226, 5 UCC Rep. 1185 (1968).
31. First Security Bank of Brookfield a. Fastwich, Inc., 30
UCC Rep. 1609 (Mo. App. 1981).
32. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Security Pacific Nat'l. Bank, 85
Cal. App. 3d 797, 149 Cal. Rptr. 883, 25 UCC Rep. 495
(1978).
33. See Abby Fin. Corp. e. Margrove Mfg. Co., 5 UCC Rep.
1088 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968); Model Business Corporation Act
§76(e).
34. UCC §3403 Official Comment 3. See Schwartz a. Disney-
land Vista Records, 383 So.2d 1117, 29 UCC Rep. 1321
(Fla. App. 1980).
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have adhered to this rule even though it can work a harsh
result in cases where it was understood that the signature
was intended to bind the corporate principal and not the
agent. Rule Four might not permit agents to escape per-
sonal liability even if their personal signatures are pre-
ceded by the word "by" (by Brian Douglas) when their
corporate principal is not named anywhere in the instru-
ment. This is because "by," without more, has been held
insufficient to show representative capacity.n
A minority of courts have permitted the admission of
paml evidence allowing an agent to avoid personal liabil-
ity when the suit involved the immediate parties to an
instrument In one of these cases a corporate officer was
able to avoid personal indorser's liability on a note. The
note was on a preprinted form. On the maker's signature
line was the typewritten name of the corporate debtor. On
the line below one of the officers, Derek, had signed his
name showing representative capacity. On another line
the officer whose liability was in question, Buetel, had
signed in personal form. (It was conceded that this was
intended to be a representative signature.) The reverse
side of the note also contained Dorek's representative
signature and Buetel's personal signature. The court rea-
soned that the presence of Dorek's representative in-
dorsement raised the possibility that Buetel's indorse-
ment was also intended to bind the corporation. This am-
biguity opened the door to parol evidence which, though
controverted, was sufficient to demonstrate that the payee
had requested that Buetel sign as a representative.35
Another ease upheld the admission of parol evidence
when the payee admitted that a corporate note had been
intended and the officers who signed in personal form as
makers on the face of the note had also made personal
guarantees on the back of the note. The guarantees, which
would have been superfluous if personal maker's liability
was intended, had been discharged through the payee's
failure to perfect a security interest securing payment of
the note. 7
An agent may be at personal risk on an instrument
which contains an incorrect corporate name that is not in
sufficiently close proximity to the agent's individual sig-
nature. This was the result in a case involving a note
which did not name the corporation as a maker in its
body, but contained a hand-printed address and incorrect
corporate name in the lower left hand comer on lines
which were designated for an address. The agent's hand-
written personal signature appeared in the lower right-
hand comer in the part of the note designated for signa-
tures. The court regarded the case as falling under Rule
Fourand not under Rules Five and Six, reasoning that the
corporation was not sufficiently named so as to raise a
question of fact as to whether the signer was acting in a
representative capacity. 8
35. Giacalone v. Bernstein, 348 So.2d 679, 22 UCC Rep. 725
(Fla. App. 1977). Compare text at footnote 44 infra.
36. Weather-Rite, Inc. v. Southdale Pro-Bowl, Inc., 301 Minn.
346,222 N.W.2d 789,15 UCC Rep. 664 (1974).
37. First Bank & Trust Co. e. Post, 10 II. App. 3d 127, 293
N.E.2d 907,12 UCC Rep. 512 (1973). See UCC §3-606.
38. Southern Oxygen Supply Co. v. DCeolian, 230 Ga. 405,197
S.E.2d 374, 12 UCC Rep. 916 (1973).
39. UCC 3-403(3) ("Except as otherwise established").
40. Haatampa Corp. v. Walton Drug Co., 354 So.2d 1235,
1236, 24 UCC Rep. 182, 186 (Fla. App. 1978).
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2. Agent's Liability Where Compliance
with Rule Three Is Ambiguous
Rule Three provides that when a corporate name is
preceded or followed by the name and office of the sign-
ing agent the corporation will be liable on the instrument
and the agent will not (Alpha Corp. by Brian Douglas,
President). The rule permits the introduction of parol
evidence." One court has held that such evidence is ap-
propriate when the name of the principal and signature
and office of the agent are not in sufficiently close refer-
ence to each other." It reasoned that reasonable men
should be able to understand from the face of the instru-
ment that the agent signed as a representative and not in
an individual capacity.
Whether this requisite degree of certainty exists must
be worked out on a case-by-case basis. It seems clear that
Rule Three is complied with in the case of an instrument
that states across its top that it is in payment of the debt of
a named corporation and is signed by agents who state
their offices.4" Moving toward the opposite extreme, a
court has held that paml evidence was admissible to
clarify the meaning of a note that contained language of
joint liability both in its body ("we promise to pay") and
in its signature (Alpha Corp. and/or Brian Douglas, Presi-
dent)." Another court found ambiguity in a note made by
a corporation which corporate officers had indorsed by
signing their names followed by their official titles." One
of the officers had also indorsed on behalf of the corporate
principal in Rule Three form. The Court permitted the
introduction of parol evidence that the officers had in-
dorsed in personal capacities because it was unlikely that
the corporation would both make and indorse the same
instrument. These cases illustrate the importance of
careful compliance with Rule Three if personal agent lia-
bility is to be avoided. Ambiguous compliance opens the
door to agent liability even ifthe actual intent was to bind
only the corporate principal.
3. Agent's Personal Liability
when Corporation Named but Representative
Capacity Not Shown
A threshold issue may be whether representative
capacity is shown on the face of the instrument. Such
capacity may be suggested, but not conclusively estab-
lished, through use of the word "by" preceding the
agent's name even if the agent's office is not indicated
(Alpha Corp. by Brian Douglas)."
Corporate instruments are frequently executed so as to
name the corporation but do not show the representative
capacity of the signing agent (Alpha Corp. Brian Doug-
las). Rule Five indicates that this form of signature per-
sonally obligates the agent. Rule Six creates an exception
41. Phoenix Air Conditioning Co. v. Pound, 123 Ca. App. 523,
181 S.E.2d 719,9 UCC Rep. 483 (1971).
42. Havatampa Corp. v. Walton Drug Co., 354 So.2d 1235,
1236,24 UCC Rep. 182, 186 (Fla. App. 1978).
43. Trenton Trust Co. v. Klausman, 222 Pa. Super. 400, 296
A.2d 275, 11 UCC Rep. 787 (1972).
44. Main Gas & Appliances, Inc. v. Siegel, 438 A.2d 888, 32
UCC Rep. 1534 (Me. 1981); Chidakel v. Blonder, 431 A.2d
594, 31 UCC Rep. 1642 (D.C. App. 1981). But compare
Ciacalone v. Bernstein, 348 So.2d 679, 22 UCC Rep. 725
(Fla. App. 1977) (Note did not name corporate principal).
See footnote 51 and accompanying text infra.
which permits the introduction ofparol evidence relevant
to the issue of whether personal liability was contem-
plated when the dispute is between immediate parties.
These rules create a two-edged sword. They authorize the
use of parol evidence to enable the agent to escape per-
sonal liability. But the immediate party seeking enforce-
ment may invoke parol evidence proving that personal
liability was intended.
41
Rules Five and Six have been the subject of frequent
judicial application in cases in which agents sought to
escape liability on instruments signed in the manner of
the example in the preceding paragraph. Agents have
also sought to escape liability through application ofthese
rules to instruments which were signed in this manner,
but which also contained language of joint liability in the
body of the instrument. The results in the latter group of
cases are inconsistent. A corporate president was permit-
ted to introduce evidence that he signed as representative
when the note stated that "the undersigned jointly and
severally promise to pay."47 On the other hand, another
court did not permit the introduction of such evidence
when the body of the note contained the words "we
promise to pay."9 Thus, there is a risk that joint language
might cause a court to apply Rule Four even though the
corporation is named and the agent's liability arguably
should be determined under Rules Five and Six.
Rules Five and Six do not allow an agent to escape
personal liability when a remote party such as an indorsee
seeks to enforce an instrument. This has been'the result
when the instrument was a check imprinted with the cor-
porate name 49 and when the instrument was a corporate
note which contained language of single party liability ("I
promise to pay").10
Although Rules Five and Six would seem to leave no
room for the admission ofparol evidence between remote
parties, agents have had some success in arguing that an
instrument must be considered in its entirety and that an
imprinted corporate name impliedly discloses represen-
tative capacity.5'
4. Agent's Personal Liability
when Representative Capacity Shown
but Corporation Not Named
Rules Five and Six apply to signatures made by agents
that indicate their representative capacity but do not
name the corporation (Brian Douglas, President). Parol
evidence relevant to the issue of whether personal liabil-
ity was intended should be admissible in an action be-
45. Maine Gas & Appliances, Inc. v. Siegel, 438 A.2d 888, 32
UCC Rep. 1534 (Me. 1981).
46. Sullivan County Wholesalers, Inc. v. Sullivan County
Dorms, 59 App. Div. 2d 628, 398 N.Y.S.2d 180, 22 UCC
Rep. 994 (1977); St. Croix Eng'g Corp. v. McLay, 304
N.W.2d 912, 31 UCC Rep. 619 (Minn. 1981).
47. Rosedale State Bank & Trust Co. v. Stringer, 2 Kan. App.
2d 331,579 P.2d 158,24 UCC Rep. 660 (1978).
48. Colonial Film & Equip. Co. v. MacMillan Professional
Magazines, Inc., 148 Ca. App. 632, 252 S.E.2d 61, 26 UCC
Rep. 1190 (1979).
49. Financial Assors. v. Impact Mktg, Inc., 90 Misc. 2d 545,
394 N.Y.S.2d 814,21 UCC Rep. 1369 (Civ. Ct 1977).
50. 0. P. Ganjo, Inc. v. Tri-Urban Realty Co., 180 N.J. Super.
517, 261 A.2d 722, 7 UCC Rep. 302 (1969).
51. Follin v.Mindy Mfg. Co., 211 Pa. Super. 87, 236 A.2d 542, 4
UCC Rep. 827 (1967).
tween the immediate parties.52 Here again, there can be
an issue of whether representative capacity is shown. It
has been held that it is not shown by the word "by" pre-
ceding an agenfs name (by Brian Douglas)." This results
in the signature binding the agent personally under Rule
FoUL
5. Evidence of Intent to Make
Personal or Corporate Signatures
The preceding discussion indicates that in many situa-
tions courts may entertain proof of whether the parties
intended an agent to be personally bound on an instru-
ment Some courts have found the following facts support
an inference of an intent to create corporate and not per-
sonal liability; (a) Knowledge that the signer was an
agent or was doing business in corporate form; (b) En-
forcement action against agent-indorser instituted after
suit against corporation not successful or judgment
against corporation proved uncollectable; (c) Instrument
issued in payment for transaction billed to corporation;
(d) Corporate name imprinted on check; (e) Prior course
of dealing under which instruments signed by agents
were accepted in payment of corporate principal's obli-
gations; (i) Disclosure of representative capacity com-
municated prior to issuance of instrument; (g) Execution
of note contemporaneous with execution of a corporate
document such as an agreement creating a security inter-
est in corporate assets.
On the other hand, the following facts have been
viewed as suggesting an intent to create personal liability:
(a) Request for personal agent liability prior to issuance of
the instrument or other circumstances indicating that a
corporate instrument without personal agent liability
would have been unacceptable; (b Communication from
payee to corporate officer prior to execution of instrument
expressing the former's belief that the latter would be
personally bound upon signing.
While some of these fact patterns are ambiguous or not
individually persuasive, they can have cumulative
weight,
6. Defenses OfPersonally Liable Agents
If an agent is personally liable on an instrument it may
be possible to assert defenses such as that issuance of the
instrument was induced through fraud.6 However, a
holder in due course seeking to enforce the instrument
would cut off most defenses."
52. National Bank of Georgia v. Ament, 127 Ga. App. 311, 195
S.E.2d 202,12 UCC Rep. 311 (1973).
53. Giacalone v. Bernstein, 348 So.2d 679, 22 UCC Rep. 725
(Fla. App. 1977). Compare footnote 44 and accompanying
textsupra.
54. Cases discussing the types ofproofaenumerated in the text
would include St. Croix Eng'g Corp. v. MeLay, 304
N.W.2d 912, 31 UCC Rep. 619 (Minn. 1981); Scale v.
Nichols, 505 S.W.2d 251, 14 UCC Rep. 457 (Tex. 1974);
First Bank & Trust Co. v. Post, 10 Ill. App. 3d 127, 293
N.E.2d 907, 12 UCC 512 (1973). See generally 7 Am. Jur.
Proof of Facts 2d 675 (1975).
55. Main Gas & Appliance, Inc. v. Siegel, 438 A.2d 888, 32
UCC Rep. 1534 (Me. 1981).
56. Factors & Note Buyers, Inc. v. Green Lane, Inc., 102 NJ.
Super. 43, 245 A.2d 223, 5 UCC Rep. 611 (1968); Malone &
Hyde, Inc. v. Parson, 642 S.W.2d 157 (Tenn. App. 1982).
57. See UCC §3-305.
COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL
G. Liability Of Unauthorized Signer
Rule Seven indicates that an unauthorized signature
binds the signer on the instrument in the capacity in
which he signed in favor of any person who in good faith
pays the instrument or takes it for value. However, a per-
son who knows that the signature was not authorized may
be unable to recover on the instrument from the signer.5
The Code defines unauthorized signature to include
those made without actual, implied, or apparent authority
including forgeries'"
H. Liability Through Ratification,
Estoppel or Negligence
An unauthorized signature may become binding on the
person whose name is signed if the person ratifies it. It
has been held that the Code incorporates the agency law
concept of ratification described by the Restatement
(Second) of the Law of Agency.60 The Restatement pro-
vides that ratification is the affirmance by a person of a
prior act which did not bind him but which was done or
professedly done on his account. This results in the act
being given effect as if originally authorized.6' Under
agency principles, ratification requires intent to ratify
plus full knowledge of all material facts. Ratification may
be express or implied.62 The Code's official comments
indicate that ratification relieves the actual signer from
liability on the signature.
The question ofwhether an unauthorized signature was
ratified is fact specific and has been litigated with some
frequency." A ratification may be found in the retention
of benefits received in a transaction involving an unau-
thorized signature.5 This would occur, for example,
where a corporate officer obtains salary payments from
the corporation after learning that his personal signature
had been forged on a note evidencing a loan to the corpo-
ration and the corporation would have been unable to pay
the salary without the loan.86
The Code also binds a person on an unauthorized sig-
nature if that person is precluded from denying the au-
thority on grounds of estoppel or negligence" An estop-
pel can arise against a person who expressly or tacitly
represents that his signature on an instrument is genuine.
Negligence can also preclude a denial of authenticity.6 8
Facts supporting ratification and estoppel may be closely
related and facts justifying an estoppel may also support a
finding ofnegligence6s
58. UCC §3-404 Official Comment 2.
59. UCC §1-201(43).
60. Thermos Contracting Corp. v. The Bank of New Jersey, 69
NJ. 43, 354 A.2d 291, 18 UCC Rep. 1096 (1976). See gener-
ally 7Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 675 (1975).
61. Restatement (Second) of Agency §82 (1958).
62. Thermos Contracting Corp. v. The Bank of New Jersey, 69
N.J. 43, 354 A.2d 291, 18 UCC Rep. 1096 (1976).
63. UCC §3-404 Official Comment 3.
64. Annot, What Constitutes Ratification of Unauthorized
Signature Under UCC 93404, 93 A.L.a.3d 967 (1980).
65. UCC §3-404 Offical Comment 3.
66. Common Wealth Ins. Systems, Inc. v. Kersten, 40 Cal. App.
3d 1014, 115 Cal. Rptr. 653, 15 UCC Rep. 133 (1974). See
also O'Grady v. First Union Bank, 296 N.C. 212,250 S.E.2d
587,26 UCC Rep. 146 (1978).
67. UCC §3-404(1).
68. UCC §3-404 Official Comment 4. See UCC §3-406.
69. Common Wealth Ins. Systems, Inc. v. Kersten, 40 Cal. App.
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L Lack of Corporate
Authority to Sign Instruments
The power of a corporate principal to authorize its
signature on commercial paper may be limited or sus-
pended by its charter, state statute, or in other ways. The
question may then arise whether an agent who purports to
sign commercial paper on behalf of the corporation is
bound personally under Rule Seven. Cases dealing with
this sort of issue suggestthat the agent may be at personal
risk. 0 However, they also indicate that personal liability
may be avoided if the corporation statute in question does
not expressly make officers liable for corporate obliga-
tions during the period in which the corporation's powers
are suspended. Liability may also be avoided on the
theory that the signature was ratified by the corporation.
H, Corporations or Their Agents as "Holders"
Corporations engage in joint enterprise with artificial or
natural persons and may be linked with other corporations
through common ownership or in larent-subsidiary re-
lationships. Corporations change their names or cease to
exist through merger. These facts of corporate life give
rise to problems relating to the attainment ofholder status
by corporations or their agents. A brief review of the
Code's negotiability rules provides a good starting point
for analysis of these issues.
A. Negotiability
Article Three of the Code establishes two sets of re-
quirements that must be complied with in order for a
transferee to obtain holder status. They are form require-
ments and transfer requirements. In addition, certain
purchaser requirements also must be satisfied for holder
in due course standing.
1. Form Requirements
In order to be a negotiable instrument a writing must (a)
be signed by a maker or drawer; (b) contain an uncondi-
tional promise or order to pay a sum certain in money and
no other promise, order, obligation or power given by the
maker or drawer; (c) be payable on demand or at a defi-
nite time; and (d) be payable to order or bearer." Each of
these form requirements, which are designed to identify
an instrument as negotiable and to facilitate its valuation
and transfer, is the subject of extensive statutory elabora-
tion.n
3d 1014,115 Cal. Rptr. 653,15 UCC Rep. 133 (1974).
70. Bank ofAmerica Nat'l Trust & Savings Ass'n v. Morse, 265
Or. 72, 508 P.2d 194, 12 UCC Rep. 520 (1973); Dioener-
Ilauser-Greenthal Co. v. Cinecom Theatres Eastern States,
Inc., 9 UCC Rep. 1083 (N.Y. Sup. Ct 1971). An indorse-
ment in excess ofa corporation's powers may be effective to
negotiate an instrument. See UCC §3-207(1)(a) and note 81
and accompanying text infra.
71. UCC §3-104(1). Form requirement (b) must be read with
UCC 3-112. See generally Annot., What Constitutes Un-
conditional Promise to Pay Under Uniform Commercial
Code §3-104(lXb), 88 A.LR.3d 1100 1980).
72. UCC §§3-105 to 3-117. Checks normally meet these re-
quirements because of their spare and standardized lan-
guage. They may remain negotiable even if the back of the
check contains additional language, such as instructions
limiting the time for deposit to a future date. Silver Crea-
tions, Ltd. v. United Parcel Service, 133 N.J. Super. 554,
337 A.2d 16 UCC Rep. 1299 (1975). However, form re-
quirements can create drafting pitfalls with respect to
notes.
2. Transfer Requirements
A holder is a person who has possession of a negoti-
able instrument and who is entitled to payment thereon.
Issuance and negotiation are the forms of transfer which
make it possible for the transferee to be a holder.01 As the
following examples demonstrate, the particular type of
transfer required is controlled by the form of the instru-
ment.
Example One: Check drawn by Alpha Corp. payable
to the order of Beta Corp. This is an "order" instrument
because it is payable to the order ofa specified person.
It may be issued merely by delivery of the instrument
to Beta Corp. 4
Example Two: Check drawn by Alpha Corp. payable
to cash. This is a "bearer" instrument because it does
not designate a specific payee. It may be issued to Beta
Corp. in the same manner as in Example One.
75
Example Three: Alpha Corp. is in possession of a
check naming it as payee. If Alpha Corp. wishes to
negotiate this order instrument to First Bank, it will
have to indorse and deliver. Alpha Corp. may preserve
the instrument in order form by making a "special" in-
dorsement that specifies that the instrument is payable
to First Bank (Pay to the Order of First Bank. Alpha
Corp. by Brian Douglas, Treasurer)2s Alternatively,
Alpha Corp. may convert the instrument to bearer form
by making a "blank" indorsement which specifies no
particular indorsee and may consist ofa mere signature
(Alpha Corp. by Brian Douglas, Treasurer).
7
Example Four: Alpha Corp. is in possession of a
check payable to cash. If Alpha Corp. wishes to ne-
gotiate this bearer instrument to First Bank, it can do so
by delivery. Alpha Corp. may convert the instrument to
order form by specially indorsing it to First Bank as
shown in the preceding example.78
73. UCC §§1-201(20), 3-102(1)(a), 3-202(1). A holder who meets
certain additional requirements can qualify as a holder in
due course. UCC §3-302-3-304. See generally McDonnell,
Freedom From Claims and Defenses: A Study in Judicial
Activism Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 17 GA. L.
REv. 569, 583-608 (1983).
74. UCC §§3-202(1), 3-110(1).
75. UCC §§3-111,3-202(1).
76. UCC §3-204(1).
77. UCC §3-204(2).
78. First Bank may convert the blank indorsement into a spe-
cial indorsement. See UCC §3-204(3)..
79. UCC §3-202(2).
80. UCC §3-202(2); See James Talcott, Inc. v. Fred Ratowsky
Assocs. Inc., 38 Pa. D. & C.2d 624, 2 UCC Rep. 1134
(1965); Lamson v. Commercial Credit Corp., 531 P.2d 966,
16 UCC Rep. 756 (Colo. 1975). The character of an in-
dorsement is not affected by words of assignment, eondi-
tion or guarantee, or the like. UCC §3-202(4)- An indorse-
ment may be conditional, purport to prohibit further trans-
Any necessary indorsement must be written by or on
behalf of the bolder.79 A signature on a separate sheet of
paper (called an "allonge") may serve as an indorsement
if the paper is firmly affixed to an instrument so as to
become a part thereof It may also be necessary that there
be no room forthe indorsement on the instrument itself.
s0
The Code provides that a corporate holder may ef-
fectively negotiate an instrument even if it is exceeding its
statutory or charter powers so that the transaction relating
to the instrument is void.s" This follows from the inherent
characteristic of negotiable instruments that a holder has
the right to negotiate and confer holder status on a trans-
feree. The Code should not be read as providing that the
transaction is not void, corporate charter or corporation
statute to the contrary notwithstanding. If the corporation
actually exceeded its powers, its indorsement contract on
the instrument may not be enforceable by a holder or, in
some cases, by a holder in due course.n The Code does
not make all corporate commercial paper contracts intra
vires.
One consequence of this dichotomy between corporate
power to negotiate and corporate liability appears to be
that the maker of a note would remain liable thereon to
the ultimate holder even if the indorsement by the corpo-
rate payee of the instrument was ultra vires. Extra-Code
law might permit the corporation to rescind its negotia-
tion, but such a right could be cut off by a holder in due
course."
3. Purchaser Requirements
In order to be a holder in due course, a person must be a
holderet A holder in due course must also take the in-
strument (a) for value; (b) in good faith; and (c) without
notice that it is overdue or has been dishonored or of any
defense or claim to it on the part of any person." Each of
these requirements is the subject of statutory elabora-
tion,8 6 including provisions relating to the issue of when
notice received by a corporation is effective.87
A holder in due course takes the instrument free from
all claims to it on the part of any person. 9 A holder in due
course also cuts off the defenses of any party to the in-
fer of an instrument, or otherwise seek to resrict its transfer.
The most important types of restrictive indorsements are
those that include words such as "for collection" or "for
deposit" and which are commonly placed on checks. UCC
§3-205, -206.
81. UCC §3-207(1)(a) and Official Comment 2.
82. UCC §W3-207 Official Comment 4; 3-305(2)(b).
83. UCC §3-207(2) and Official Comment 5. See note 90 and
accompanying text infra.
84. UCC §1-201(20). Concerning whether a transferee may ob-
tain holder status through application of the "shelter" doc-
trine, see generally B. Clark, The Law of Bank Deposits,
Collections and Credit Cards 1.2(2) (1981) and note 89
infra.
85. UCC §3-302(1).
86. UCC W§3-303 to -304, 1-201(19), 1-201(25) to (28), 1-
201(44), 4-209. See generally Annot., Value: Who is a
Holder of an Instrumentfor Value Under UCC §3-303, 97
A.L..3d 1283 (1979).
87. UCC §§1-2015(27) to (28).
88. UCC §3-305(1).
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strument with whom the holder has not dealt with certain
exceptions. 9 Defenses that are cut off sometimes re-
ferred to as "personal defenses," include failure of con-
sideration, breach of warranty and mistake. The defenses
that are not cut off are sometimes referred to as the "real"
defenses. They include discharge through insolvency
proceedings and lack of legal capacity if the incapacity
renders the instrument null under extra-Code law. In-
capacity might be the result of ultra vires acts or a lack of
corporate authority to do business.9 0
B. Corporations or Corporate Agents as "Holders"
A corporation must he the holder of an instrument in
order to enforce the contracts contained therein or to
negotiate it. The possessory requirement for holder status
may he satisfied through possession of an instrument by
an agent on behalf of the corporation.9' Whether the
agent's possession was for corporate or some other pur-
pose can raise factual issues turning on intent which may
require resort to extra-Code law including the doctrine of
constructive possession."
1. Instrument in Wrong Name
In order to be a holder of order paper, it is necessary for
an instrument to be drawn, issued, or indorsed to the cor-
poration or its order. Sometimes the intended holder may
be in possession of an order instrument that does not state
the holder's correct name. For example, a check intended
for Alpha Corp. may be payable to the order of a wrong
name (Alpha Ltd.) or personally to an officer of Alpha
Corp. (Brian Douglas) or to a different corporation (Beta
Corp.) or to a trade name of Alpha Corp. (Alpha High
Tech). In these situations Alpha Corp. may indorse in the
"wrong" name or its "correct" name or both. 3 A person
giving value for the instrument (such as a bank that cashes
a check) is entitled to an indorsement in both names. In
order to enforce such an instrument Alpha Corp. may
have to prove that the instrument was actually intended
for it and not some other person with the "wrong" name.
89. Payees can qualify as holders in due course. However, this
will usually not be ofpractical significance because holders
in due course may cut off only the defenses of parties with
whom they did not deal. Payees typically have direct deal-
ings with makers and drawers.
A transferee of an instrument who does not qualify as a
holder in due course in its own right is essentially in the
position of a mere assignee that has no better rights than its
assignor. UCC §3-306. However, if the transferor was a
holder in due course, then the transferee may succeed to
the transferr's rights under the "shelter" doctrine. UCC'
§3-201(1). There may be limitations on the rights of a
transferee under the "shelter doctrine." See UCC §3-201
Official Comments 1-3; Security Pacific Nat'l Bank v.
Chess, 58 Cal. App. 3d 555,129 Cal. Rptr. 852,19 UCC Rep.
544 (1976).
90. UCC §3-305(2)(b) and Official Comment 5. See generally
Annot., Fraud in the inducement and Fraud in the Factum
as Defense Against Holder in Due Course, 78 A.L.R.3d 1020
(1980).
91. Bryan o. Bartlett, 435 F.2d 28, 8 UCC Rep. 535 (8th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 915 (1971).
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2.Joint and Alternative Instruments
In some instances an instrument may intentionally be
made payable jointly to a corporation and one of its offi-
cers (Brian Douglas and Alpha Corp.) or to multiple cor-
porations (Alpha Corp. and Beta Corp.). In such cases, the
instrument may be negotiated, discharged or enforced
only by all of the named persons. 4 For example, both
must indorse in order to negotiate the instrument. If the
instrument is payable in the alternative (Brian Douglas or
Alpha Corp.), it may be negotiated, discharged, or en-
forced by either named person. 95
Sometimes it is difficult to detenjine whether an in-
strunent is payable jointly, in the alternative, or in some
other manner. It has been held that checks payable in the
form "Alpha Corp Beta Corp." and "Alpha Corp. payable
to Beta Corp." are joint checks. On the other hand, it has
also been held that a check payable in the form "Brian
Douglas, Alpha Corp." is neither ajoint nor an alternative
check. Rather, the court decided that the check was pay-
able to Brian Douglas unconditionally under a Code pro-
vision, discussed below, concerning instruments payable
with words of description.97 Instruments payable in the
form "Alpha CorpBeta Corp." or to the order of "Alpha
Corp. and/or Beta Corp." are payable in the alternative.
Caution must be exercised in the case of joint instru-
ments. If one named person were to indorse the other's
signature without authorization and obtain payment of
the instrument, the indorser may be exposed to civil lia-
bility for conversion and criminal liability for forgery. A
party who honors an instrument bearing such an unau-
thorized indorsement may also be liable for conversion or
may have to pay twice because the payment did not result
in a discharge.9'
3. Instrument Payable with Words of Description
Sometimes an instrument may he made payable to an
individual with additional words describing him as an
agent or officer of a specified corporation (Brian Douglas,
President Alpha Corp.). This form of instrument is pay-
able to the corporate principal, but the agent or officer
may act as if he were the holder which means that he can
92. Billingsley v. Kelly, 261 Md. 116, 274 A.2d 113, 8 UCC Rep.
1063 (1971).
93. UCC §3-203; Gabovitch v. Coolidge Bank & Trust Co., 29
UCC Rep. 1313 (Mass. App. 1980);Agalistis v. Agliotis, 38
N.C. App. 42,247 S.E.2d 28 (1978).
94. UCC §3-116(b). See generally Murray, Joint Payee
Checks-Forged and Missing Indorsements, 78 CoMM. L. J.
393 (1973).
95. UCC §3-116(a).
96. See Equipment Distributors, Inc. v. Charter Oak Bank &
Trust Co., 20 UCC Rep. 1231 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1977); Bar-
den & Robeson Corp. v. Tompkins County Trust Co., 67
Mise.2d 587, 324 N.Y.S.2d 543,67 Misr.2d587, 9 UCC Rep.
1088 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1971).
97. Swiss Baco Skyling Logging, Inc. e. Haliewicz, 18 Wash.
App. 21, 567 P.2d 1141, 22 UCC Rep. 441 (1977). See note
103 and accompanying text infra.
98. Dynalectron Corp. o. Union First Nat'l Bank, 488 F.Supp.
868, 29 UCC Rep. 131 (D.C. Cir. 1980); UCC §3-116 Offi-
cial Comment.
99. An excellent entree into the law relating to forged indorse-
ments will be found in Clark, supra note 84, at 6.4.
negotiate the instrument. Thus, a transferee from the
agent can be a holder and, if it lacks knowledge that the
agent was violating a fiduciary duty to the corporate prin-
cipal, a holder in due course."'
If the instrument names an individual payee and de-
scribes him as an agent or officer without designating the
corporate principal (Brian Douglas, President), the in-
strument is payable unconditionally to the agent or officer
and the additional words have no effect on subsequent
parties."'2 The instrument may be considered payable to
the individual payee personally. The check described
above payable to "Brian Douglas, Alpha Corp." was held
to fall under this category.'
An instrument made payable to the order of an officer
by his title (Treasurer of Alpha Corp.) is payable to the
corporate principal. However, the officer (or his succes-
sor) may act as if he is the holder of the instrument.m
4. Change of Corporate Name or Form
If a corporation changes its name (Alpha Corp. to Beta
Corp.) and then seeks to enforce an instrument payable
under the obsolete name, it may have difficulty estab-
lishing that it is a holder. It is arguable that the obsolete
name is a "wrong" name and that an effective indorse-
ment could be made in either the obsolete name or the
new name.iw It would follow that the corporation should
be able to enforce the instrument upon establishing the
fact of the name change," 6 This fact might be established
through production of a certificate of amended articles
showing the name change.20r
A comparable problem may arise when a corporation
seeks to enforce an order instrument as surviving corpo-
ration through merger when the instrument remains pay-
able to the order of the merging corporation. A ease de-
cided under the UCC apparently holds that absent an
indorsement by the merging corporation, the surviving
corporation may not be permitted holder status in its own
right.1"'
Prudence may dictate obtaining the merging corpora-
tion's indorsement prior to the merger. However, this
holding arguably confuses a merger with a transfer ofcor-
porate assets. The surviving corporation in a merger is not
a transferee of the merging corporation's assets. Bather,
after a merger the surviving corporation is entitled to the
personal property of the merging corporation by opera-
tion of the corporation statute."' Thus, an instrument
payable to the order of the merging corporation arguably
100. UCC §3-117(a) and Official Comment 1.
101. UCC §§3-304(2), 3-304(4)(e); Maber, Ino. v. Factor Cab
Corp., 19 App. Div. 2d 500,244 N.Y.S.2d 768, 2 UCC Rep.
532(1963).
102. UCC §3-117(c).
103. See text at note 97supra.
104. uCC §3-110(1)(0.
105. See text at note 93 supra.
106. Lawson v. Finance America Private Brands, Inc., 537
S.W.2d 483, 19 UCC Rep. 1167 (Teax. Civ. App. 1976).
107. See Model Business Corporation Act §63 (1982).
108. Econo-Travel Motor Hotel Corp. v. Taylor, 301 N.C. 200,
becomes payable to the surviving corporation by opera-
tion of law and no indorsement should be required to
make the surviving corporation a holder. Counsel for the
surviving corporation also might argue that the instru-
ment is payable to its clients under a "wrong name" and
establish the fact of the merger through production of a
certificate of merger. 110
5. Wrongful Appropriation of
Instrument Intended for a Corporation
There will be many situations in which corporate offi-
cers or agents such as bookkeepers, cashiers, salesmen
and others will have the opportunity to wrongfully appro-
priate corporate instruments (and the proceeds thereof)
for noncorporate purposes. This risk is increased by the
fact that corporations cannot always control the form of
instruments (particularly checks) that are intended for
their coffers. Fidelity bonds may be purchased in order to
insure employers against the risk of employee fraud. The
following examples illustrate the legal position ofa corpo-
rate principal with respect to wrongfully appropriated in-
struments.
Example 1. Check payable to the order of Alpha
Corp. deposited to the personal account of employee
Brian Douglas. This instrument can be negotiated only
by an authorized signature on behalf of the corporation.
An authorized signature would also be required in the
case of a joint check (Alpha Corp. and Brian Douglas).
In either case, the absence of an authorized signature
could prevent a transferee from being a holder and,
therefore, a holder in due course."'
The transferee of a misappropriated instrument can be
expected to argue that the indorsement was authorized.
This argument may be successful if the agent had broad
authority to administer corporate funds)" On the other
hand, corporate agents may be found to have only limited
authority such as to collect checks for forwarding to their
principal.113 A transferee under an unauthorized signature
can also claim that the corporate principal was negligent
in supervising the agent or officer or might envoke ratifi-
cation or estoppel doctrine." 4 These arguments may re-
sult in an effective indorsement.
All may not be lost for the corporate principal if the
indorsement on a wrongfully appropriated instrument is
271 S.E.2d 54, 30 UCC Rep. 1319 (1980).
109. Model Business Corporation Act §76(d)(1982). See gener-
ally, W. Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law ofPrivate Corpo-
rations, §§7044,7088, 7090 (Rev. ed. 1983).
110. See Model Business Corporation Act §74.
111. UCC §§3-302(1); 3-306.
112. Farmers Union Coop. Acs'n v. Commercial State Bank, 187
Neb. 376, 191 N.W.2d 168, 9 UCC Rep. 1080 (1971). See
UCC §3-207(1)(d).
113. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. a. Hepler State Bank, 6 Kan.
App. 2d 543, 630 P.2d 721, 32 UCC Rep. 187 (1981).
114. See section I.H. of this article.
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binding. The transferee cannot be a holder in due courseif it had knowledge at the time of transfer that thefiduciary negotiated the instrument for his own benefit orotherwise in breach of duty.1'5
Example 2. Check intended for corporation pay-
able to Brian Douglas deposited to the personal ac-
count of Brian Douglas. The risk to the corporation is
115. UCC §§3-304(2), 3-304(4)(e); Mott Grain Co. v. First NatlBank & Trust Co. of Bismarck, 259 N.W.2d 667, 23 UCC
increased in the case of cheeks that run to an officer oragent in a form that gives that officer the status of aholder. As a holder the agent can negotiate the instru-ment and make the transferee a holder. If the transferee
also qualifies as a holder in due course, it will receive
title to the instrument and cut offmost corporate claims
and defensesis6 As was the ease in Example One,knowledge of a breach of fiduciary duty may prevent
the transferee from obtaining holder in due coursestatus. Q@
Rep. 104 (N.D. 1977) The Code follows the policy of theUniform Fiduciaries Act. UCC §3-304 Ofieial Comment 5.116. UCC §3-207(1)(d) and Official Comments.
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